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THE GENESIS OF THE FOURTEEN COMMANDMENTS

"WITH its causes and objects," said the President, of the war, "we are not concerned. The obscure fountains from which its stupendous flood has burst forth, we are not interested to search for or explore."

We cannot apply these words of the President to his own "only possible programme of the world's peace". Indeed, we should not do so if we could. Since his first promulgation of them more than a year ago the Fourteen Commandments have been the theme of all but universal consideration. They were assumed, rightly or wrongly, to form the basis of the armistice which suspended the war. They have since been acclaimed by Germany as containing the conditions of peace to which she will loyally adhere but from which she will not be willing to deviate by so much as a hair's breadth. Their promotion among the people, and incidentally among the Governments, of Europe appears to have been the chief purpose of the President's extraordinary excursion across the sea; and it is understood that they are to be urged upon the Peace Congress as its ultimate agenda. Surely it is fitting that we should concern ourselves with their origin, and should search for and explore the fountains from which they burst forth; though it may be that we shall not find those fountains particularly obscure.

There has appeared to prevail an impression that they were all an original conception of the President's, formulated and put forth on his sole responsibility, and that the accept-

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ance of them by the other Powers would be a signal personal triumph for him, tantamount to the imposition of his will and his leadership upon the Allied nations. We cannot suppose that in his self-abnegatory devotion to duty he has sought or desired such distinction for himself, though naturally it would be gratifying to him as to all the nation to have the United States thus take the initiative in the re-establishment of peace upon the only possible basis of justice. We owe it to candor, however,—in Monroe's phrase,—to confess that review of the record seems to deny us that pleasant privilege, and to compel us, regretfully, to conclude that the President had merely caught, as he himself said on another occasion, the voices of humanity which were in the air; or rather, perhaps, the oracular voices of other Governments which he had himself solicited; which he then reproduced in his own deft and persuasive phrases.

It was on January 8, 1918, that the Fourteen Commandments were enunciated. But it was long before, it was on December 18, 1916, that the President suggested to the belligerent Powers, of which we were not yet one, the desirability of an early statement of their conceptions of the necessary terms of peace. The very next day Mr. Lloyd George spoke epigrammatically of "restitution, reparation, and guarantees against repetition," and taking the cue from that the Allies on January 10, 1917, nearly a year before the promulgation of the Fourteen Commandments, made a formal and detailed reply, in which they named as necessary terms of peace the following:

The restoration of Belgium, Serbia and Montenegro, with the compensation due to them; the evacuation of the invaded territories in France, in Russia, in Roumania, with just reparation; the reorganization of Europe, guaranteed by a stable régime and based at once on respect for nationalities and on the right to full security and liberty of economic development possessed by all peoples, small and great, and at the same time upon territorial conventions and international settlements such as to guarantee land and sea frontiers against unjustified attack; the restitution of provinces formerly torn from the Allies by force, or against the wish of their inhabitants; the liberation of the Italians, as also of the Slavs, Roumanes, and Czecho-Slovaks from foreign domination; the setting free of the populations subject to the bloody tyranny of the Turks; and the turning out of Europe of the Ottoman Empire as decidedly foreign to Western civilization.

It is quite obvious that in this statement was included the essential germs of a majority of the Fourteen Command-

ments; to wit, of the sixth to the thirteenth inclusive; with strong hints at the gist of some others. Following that, however, and preceding the President's promulgation of his "only possible programme," were two other still more explicit and comprehensive statements of the necessary terms of peace as seen by the Allies. One of these was a statement adopted by the Special National Labor Conference at Westminster, London, on December 28, 1917, and the other was Mr. Lloyd George's speech at the Trade Union Conference on Man Power, on January 5, 1918. Both of these were, of course, fresh in the President's mind when he uttered his Commandments on January 8, as indeed he himself at that time declared. It will be interesting to compare the Commandments with them, item by item; omitting only the Second Commandment, relating to the Freedom of the Seas, the origin of which has been confidently and positively attributed, by his biographer and eulogist, to Colonel House; though others, apparently on no less plausible grounds, ascribe a German source.

The First Commandment directs the making of "open covenants of peace" and the abolition of secret diplomacy. Ten days before, the Labor Conference declared that "The British Labor Movement relies very largely upon . . . the suppression of secret diplomacy."

The Third Commandment calls for "the removal of economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions." The Labor Conference had already declared "against all projects for an economic war . . . whether by protective tariffs or capitalist trusts or monopolies," and in favor of "the open door, and no hostile discrimination against foreign countries."

The Fourth Commandment demands reduction of armaments. "We must seek," said Mr. Lloyd George, three days before, "to limit the burden of armaments;" while ten days before the Labor Conference called for "the common limitation of the costly armaments by which all peoples are burdened."

The Fifth Commandment requires "impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon the principle that in determining all such questions the interests of the population concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the Government whose title is to be determined." Mr. Lloyd George had already declared that the colonies must be

"held at the disposal of a conference whose decision must have primary regard to the wishes and interests of the native inhabitants."

The Sixth Commandment is that Russia shall be evacuated and assisted to an unhampered and independent determination of her own political development and national policy. The Allies on January 10, 1917, had demanded the evacuation of Russia, and Mr. Lloyd George on January 5, 1918, had added "We shall be proud to fight to the end side by side by the new democracy of Russia. . . . Russia can be saved only by her own people."

The Seventh Commandment names as the first of all such acts the evacuation and restoration of Belgium, without any attempt to limit her sovereignty. Mr. Lloyd George had already said: "The first requirement always put forward by the British Government and their Allies has been the complete restoration, political, territorial and economic, of the independence of Belgium, and such reparation as can be made for the devastation of its towns and provinces." The Labor Conference also had said: "A foremost condition of peace must be the reparation by the German Government of the wrong admittedly done to Belgium; payment by that Government for all the damage that has resulted from this wrong, and the restoration of Belgium to complete and untrammelled independent sovereignty."

Again: "No other single act," said the President, "will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined." "Before there can be any hope for stable peace," Mr. Lloyd George had said, "this great breach of the public law of Europe must be repudiated and so far as possible repaired."

The Eighth Commandment runs: "All French territory should be freed and the wrong done in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine . . . should be righted, in order that peace may once more be made secure." Mr. Lloyd George had said: "We mean to stand by the French democracy in the demand they make for a reconsideration of the great wrong of 1871. . . . This sore has poisoned the peace of Europe for half a century, and until it is cured healthy conditions will not have been restored." The Labor Conference also reaffirmed "its reprobation of the crime against the peace of the world . . . in 1871," and demanded its undoing.

The Ninth Commandment calls for "a readjustment of the frontiers of Italy along clearly recognizable lines of nationality." Mr. Lloyd George had regarded "as vital the satisfaction of the legitimate claims of the Italians for union with those of their own race and tongue." The Labor Conference declared "its warmest sympathy with the people of Italian blood and speech who have been left outside of the Boundaries assigned to the Kingdom of Italy," and its support of "their claim to be united with those of their own race and tongue."

The Tenth Commandment runs: "The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development." So Mr. Lloyd George had said: "Though . . . a break-up of Austria-Hungary is no part of our war aims, we feel that unless genuine self-government is granted to those Austro-Hungarian nationalities who have long desired it, it is impossible to hope for a removal of those causes of unrest in that part of Europe which have so long threatened the general peace."

The Eleventh Commandment demands the evacuation and territorial restoration of Roumania, Serbia and Montenegro; the determination by friendly counsel of the relations of the Balkan states to one another, and international guarantees of their political and economic independence and territorial integrity. Mr. Lloyd George had demanded "the restoration of Serbia, Montenegro, and the occupied parts of Roumania;" adding that "the complete withdrawal of the alien armies and the reparation for injustice done is a fundamental condition of permanent peace." The Labor Conference demanded "the freedom of these peoples to settle their own destinies."

The Twelfth Commandment directs that while the Turkish portions of the Ottoman Empire shall have secure sovereignty, the non-Turkish nationalities must be set free, and the Dardanelles must be opened and neutralized. Mr. Lloyd George had declared that while the Allies did not challenge the maintenance of the Turkish Empire in the homelands of the Turkish race, the non-Turkish peoples were entitled to a recognition of their separate national conditions, and the Dardanelles should be internationalized and neutralized. The Labor Conference also had declared that whatever might be proposed concerning Armenia, Mesopotamia and Arabia,

they could not be restored to Turkish tyranny, and that the peace of the world required the neutralizing of the Dardanelles.

The Thirteenth Commandment calls for "an independent Polish State" to "include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations." Mr. Lloyd George, speaking for Great Britain and her Allies, had said: "We believe that an independent Poland, comprising all those genuinely Polish elements who desire to form a part of it, is an urgent necessity for the stability of Western Europe."

The Fourteenth Commandment, finally, declares that "A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike." Later commentators interpret this as a league of nations to replace the old alliances and balances of power, for the preservation of the world's peace; and there has been perhaps more controversy over it, and the President's peripatetic propaganda has been more directed to the promotion of it than all the other Commandments put together. Well, Mr. Lloyd George certainly did not deny, defy and forever exclude the notion of some such league when he said: "We are confident that a great attempt must be made to establish, by some international organization, an alternative to war as a means of settling international disputes." The Labor Conference went further. It specifically demanded: "That it should be an essential part of the treaty of peace itself that there should be forthwith established a supernational authority, or League of Nations." (It will be recalled that the President has, since the original proclamation of the Commandments, insisted that the formation of the League must not precede nor follow the treaty of peace, but must be exactly coincident with it.)

Here, then, we submit, we have the *fons et origo* of the Fourteen Commandments; a disclosure which must on the whole be regarded as reassuring and gratifying, as well as highly explanatory. It is explanatory, obviously, of the President's otherwise strange unwillingness or at least his failure to elucidate to his own countrymen the more precise meaning of such of the Commandments as seemed to the Man in the Street a trifle cryptic. Seeing that they had been so fully put forth before, he was justified in assuming that all intelligent men already understood them; while, since others

were their real authors, any further explication of them should come from those original authors, and not from him who was merely repeating the law once delivered.

It is reassuring, because it betokens sweet peace and harmony in the forthcoming councils of the Powers. In presenting the Fourteen Commandments to the Peace Conference, the President will not be introducing the apple of discord, and will not be providing matter for controversy. Rather will he be reminding his European colleagues of a *fait accompli*, which will require nothing but recognition and ratification. "May I not," we may well imagine him saying, "may I not recall to your attention the only possible programme of the world's peace, which Mr. Lloyd George more than a year ago promulgated as the will of the Allied nations?" To that there can of course be but one answer; than which nothing could be more gratifying.

Thus do we perceive the Genesis of the Fourteen Commandments, which have been so eloquently proclaimed to the world by our perambulating President. They are not his. And we hasten to add that he never claimed them. He was speaking of the indications of the Central Powers of their desire for parleys of peace, and of their illusory and deceptive tone. The Allies, on the other hand, he said, had again and again spoken clearly and made plain their terms of peace. "There is no confusion of counsel among the adversaries of the Central Powers," he said, "no uncertainty of principle, no vagueness of detail." So he went on to tell what was the programme of the world's peace; of course, as described not by himself but by all the adversaries of the Central Powers, whose counsel was so unconfused, whose principles were so certain, whose details so distinct. And the result was the Fourteen Commandments; in which, he added, "We feel ourselves to be the intimate partners of all the governments and peoples associated together against the imperialists."

It may be that some who are more Presidential than the President will regret thus to be compelled to forsake the flattering unction that the only possible programme of the world's peace was the original invention of Mr. Wilson, of which no forecast nor glimmering had ever entered another mind. The great majority will, however, agree with the President himself in recognizing the real origin of that programme, and will feel that it is after all best that it should be

so; and that it is better to be thus merely the spokesman for a united world than to be the independent projector of possible controversy and discord into the councils of the nations.

THE RIGHT AND DUTY OF CRITICISM

SENATOR JAMES HAMILTON LEWIS, flamboyant and enthusiastic in his devotion to his party chief, resents criticism of the President's public policies, and apparently regards refusal to approve all that he does and says as little short of high treason. Not long ago, it will be remembered, he wanted the Senate to ratify and confirm in advance whatever vagaries the President might indulge in in his peripatetic propaganda; which of course the Senate very properly declined to do. Now he half passionately, half plaintively laments that the Senate does not invariably give the full approval after the deed which it refused to give before it.

With the personal aspects of the case we need not much concern ourselves. The President is by far too great a man, too free from those petty self-opinionated vanities which we ungallantly call feminine, to object to receiving himself that manly, honest criticism which he is always free to bestow upon others. The public and what we may describe as the patriotic aspects are more important. We are told that criticism of the President, especially while he is on his circumambulatory mission, will impair the prestige and weaken the influence of the United States.

If this were so, it would be matter for sincere regret. But we cannot believe that it is so. We cannot believe—we should be most sorry to believe—that the President is so autocratically identified with the State, after the fashion of *le Grand Monarque*, that legitimate criticism of him militates against the Republic. Indeed, we should regret to believe that it necessarily impairs his own individual authority. There is an ancient and authentic admonition to those whom all men praise, to take heed to their ways lest they fall. We should not therefore regard universal approval as the highest of commendation for a statesman.

The notion that criticism of him is detrimental to the nation we must wholly repudiate. The prestige and influence of the United States are of no more fragile fabric than those of other lands. Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau have

not escaped criticism, even bitter denunciation. They are not hedged about by so strict a law of *lèse majesté* as is the President, and they have accordingly been more often and more severely attacked than he. But we cannot perceive that therefore Great Britain and France have declined in prestige and influence among the Powers.

There is obviously, moreover, much greater justification for criticism of the President than of either of those statesmen. That is because this nation as a whole believes that there is occasion for it, and therefore approves it, while France and Great Britain do not approve attacks upon their Prime Ministers. It is well to make this plain, even though it be not agreeable to the incense-burners of the Administration. In the midst of an intensely controversial era Mr. Lloyd George appealed to the nation in a general election, and was sustained by perhaps the largest majority ever given to any statesmen on such an occasion. In similar circumstances M. Clemenceau appealed to Parliament and received an overwhelming vote of confidence. But when the President appealed to the country for a vote of confidence, with pleas of exaggerated urgency, he did not get it.

Would people who are more Presidential than the President have the nation stultify and falsify itself? In the late general elections the American people, thoughtfully and deliberately, refused to give the President the Congress of rubber stamps for which he had asked. They elected instead a Congress which would be quite independent of his will, and which, while it would of course sustain him loyally in all patriotic measures, would hold itself free to differ from him whenever and as much as it pleased on matters of policy and of politics. Seeing that such was the will of the people, why should the present Congress unanimously and invariably show itself subservient to the Presidential will? Through every available means of expression the nation made it clear and emphatic that it did not desire the President to go abroad and did not approve his self-willed going. We know of no reason why it should now reverse itself and approve the excursion, simply because the President persisted in it against the public will. The President did not deign to explain in advance the policies which he purposed to advocate abroad, to discuss them with his Constitutional advisers, and to secure their agreement and approval before he went on his tour. There is no reason why those advisers should now approve

those policies if they do not really deem them wise and profitable.

Only the infallible are properly exempt from criticism, and the President does not claim infallibility. He has been, indeed, his own severest and most destructive critic. Again and again he has reversed his own policy, repudiated his own words, and condemned his own doctrine. For that we would not condemn him. Other and greater statesmen have done the same. But it would be manifestly unreasonable and unjust to demand that all others should be similarly variable. When the President was vehemently insisting that we were not concerned with the causes and objects of the war, there were those who thought and said otherwise, and who were in consequence reviled for disagreeing with the President. But pretty soon the President himself came around to their view and insisted that we were vitally concerned in those matters, far beyond the interest which the European Powers themselves had at first manifested. Should his critics have been condemned simply for having more vision than he, and for thus seeing clearly in 1916 what he could not see until 1918?

We must uphold, then, the right to criticise. We do more. We insist upon the patriotic duty of honest criticism. It would be an abominable thing for men to attack the President disingenuously, for the sake of mere factional advantage and at the cost of embarrassing his conduct of foreign relations; and we must regret the intemperate and as we believe wholly unfounded aspersions of having done that thing, which Senator Lewis cast upon some of the most useful and most patriotic of his colleagues. But it would also be a detestable thing for any man, and particularly for an important public servant, to condone that which he thought evil and to acquiesce in what he regarded as an error, simply because some political leader, even the President of the United States, was the author thereof.

The practical value of this exercise of duty has been demonstrated more than once in recent years. Our conduct of the war has been marked with a notable series of corrections of errors. Perhaps the errors were not all morally culpable. Perhaps they were largely such as were natural to an unprepared and inexperienced country suddenly confronted with so vast an emergency. But they were very serious errors, some of them even imperilling our success in the war.

Happily they were corrected, and in time; but it is quite certain that they were corrected because of the criticism which was directed against them, and against some of the men who had made them. The critics were inveighed against and denounced as unpatriotic, but their criticisms were heeded and were of inestimable service to the Republic. In making those criticisms they performed a patriotic duty of the first magnitude.

In the making of peace there is obviously far more room for controversy, and a far greater likelihood of differences of honest opinion, than there have been in the waging of war, and the right and duty of criticism are therefore commensurately greater. It would have been far better for the President to have discussed his peace plans with those Constitutional advisers who must finally pass upon them, before starting upon his stump-speaking tour of Europe. If he had done so, and had come to a substantial agreement, the wisdom and propriety of his going abroad would still have been most dubious, but at any rate if he had gone abroad he could truly have said what he cannot now say, that he represented the will of the American Government and nation. He did not do so. He preferred to present his plans to European audiences rather than to the American Congress. In that case he must not complain if criticism follows instead of preceding such alien presentation. The hand of Congress is not to be forced simply by slighting it. Approval of policy is not to be secured by refraining from seeking it. The right and the duty of patriotic criticism will be exercised, and it will not be the fault of the critics nor, we are confident, to the detriment of the country, if the criticism is made at a time not the most convenient or acceptable to the object of it.

A LEAGUE CONDEMNED BY ADVOCACY

It would be folly as well as gross injustice to challenge the patriotism or the scholarship of President Lowell, of Harvard University, and we shall certainly not presume to question the entire sincerity and benevolence of his advocacy of a League of Nations. But just as certainly as we credit him with those qualities are we convinced of the existence of fatal flaws in the arguments with which he eloquently pleads for the creation of such a League.

In endeavoring to dispose of some of the objections which are commonly made to such a scheme he cites first the example of Washington; or perhaps it would be better to set the example of the nation in Washington's time, since Washington was not an autocrat who would say "I am the State." It is true, he concedes, that Washington did not favor any leaguings of America with European Powers. But Washington—or the people—desired to prevent the possibility of war among the Thirteen States, and so he—or they—welded them into a League of States, or a nation.

Now that union, as an expedient for averting war, was quite successful; with one very conspicuous and important exception. But what did it imply? Obviously, as every schoolboy knows, that the States, while retaining a measure of local "State Rights", surrendered their highest attributes of sovereignty to the nation. A new, extra-State government was created, and was invested with power to compel the States to do its bidding, even against their own will. For a time this was disputed and a number of States undertook to assert their full independent sovereignty; and the result was the one exception which we have noted to the peace-preserving power of the union—and the result of that result was to establish forever the supremacy of the nation above the States.

Now if the analogy of this Union of States with the League of Nations amounts to anything at all—and President Lowell seems to think that it does and that it is a convincing argument for the League—it implies this: That the nations entering the League would surrender some of the supreme attributes of their national sovereignty to some new international or supernational government. And that, we confidently apprehend, is precisely what thoughtful and patriotic Americans generally object to doing. They are quite willing to bind the nation voluntarily, by treaty, to do so and so in dealing with other countries. They are not willing and they never should be willing to submit their country to the dictation of aliens against its own will, and to permit any other nation or combination of nations to determine what Americans shall or shall not do.

Let us pursue the analogy between the Union and the League; with a pertinent illustration now before us. An attempt is being made to adopt a prohibition amendment to the Constitution of the United States. If a certain number of

the States vote for it, it will be adopted, and will become binding upon the others, whether they want it or not. The citizens of a State might be unanimously opposed to prohibition, yet they would have it forced upon them by the will of other States. We submit that this nation ought never to place itself in a position in which such a thing might happen to it; in which, for example, by vote of the other nations in the League it would be forbidden to impose a tariff upon imports. The appeal to Washington's "League of States", therefore, creates an impression hostile rather than favorable to the present proposal.

Strangely, having thus intimated that the League of Nations would imply renunciation of sovereignty, President Lowell proceeds to deny that his scheme would have any such effect. "It has," he says, "nothing whatever to do with our sovereignty." That seems pretty flatly contradictory of his former argument based upon the analogy of the Federal Union. But that is not the worst of it. In his endeavor to justify this surprising denial of interference with national sovereignty he resorts to an argument which we should never have dreamed of attributing to him were it not expressed in his own words, and which, thus expressed, we must regard with amazed regret as quite unworthy of him. Let us quote his exact words:

Congress's power to declare war or not to is not in any way affected. We simply agree that in certain conditions we will declare war, but Congress is not bound to do it. It does not interfere with Congress in the least. It does morally bind Congress to declare war; yes, certainly; every treaty binds the country to do something.

That is to say, Congress is not bound to do what it is morally bound to do! Can it be that the President of Harvard University was in earnest in putting forth that monstrous proposition? Does he really mean that this country should enter into a solemn moral obligation of the most momentous character with the cynical reservation that "moral obligations are not binding unless Congress sees fit to approve them"? Why, that is the morality of the Hun, in regarding a treaty as a scrap of paper, to be respected only when it comports with the nation's interests to respect it. What a spectacle for gods and men it would be for this nation to enter a League of Nations and agree to a lot of principles and rules, and then say, with tongue in cheek, "It all depends upon Congress whether we keep our word or not!"

The indisputable fact is that if we entered a League of Nations and bound ourselves to go to war at command of that League, we should be doing one of two things: We should be abrogating the Constitutional function and authority of Congress, or we should be perpetrating an act of immoral hypocrisy which would degrade us to the level of the Huns.

From the analogy of the Union of States President Lowell turns to that of the citizens of a community. He says:

The nations of the world are in just the same situation that you would have been in in a frontier town of the olden days, when it was necessary for you to carry a pistol. There is only one way to stop it, and that is to make the world an orderly one.

But why is it that we do not all carry pistols now? Certainly not because we have formed a League of Men for that purpose, for we have not. Neither is it because we are in fact in such a League as citizens of a State or a community which has laws against brawling and manslaughter; because the men in the frontier town were also citizens of such a State with such laws. It is rather because the average individual standard of citizenship and manhood has been raised. Let the individual men be civilized and humanely cultivated, and it will not matter whether they carry pistols or not; there will be order and respect for life, even though the laws on the subject be lax. Let the individual men be ruffians, and there will be disorder and fighting, whether they carry pistols or not, no matter how severe the laws may be.

We believe that the same principle applies to the nations of the world. Let them have, as individual and independent nations, humane and irenic ideals and standards, and the world will be orderly and peaceful without any league, even if some of the nations do have big fleets and universal military training. Let them as nations bound together in a league have brutal and savage propensities, and the world will be filled with wars and rumors of wars, in spite of the league. Great Britain before this war had a tremendous navy, perhaps as powerful as any two others united. But nobody in his senses ever imagined that it was a menace to the peace of the world or to the freedom of the seas or to the rights of any other nation.

We may be greater idealists than President Lowell or even than President Wilson—though we know of a very high authority who said that the latter was not an idealist at all but purely and simply a doctrinaire, which is a very different

thing—but we confidently believe that the hope of the world does not lie in leagues of nations or international melting pots, or attempts at abolition of armaments, or any such artificial but material thing, but rather in the raising and humanizing and ennobling of the standard of individual nations. All the leagues in the world would not insure order if the component nations were disorderly. But if all the nations were orderly, there would be order without any league at all.

JAMES RUSSELL LOWELL

February 22, 1819

We sit in the Promised Land
That flows with Freedom's honey and milk;
But 'twas they won it, sword in hand,
Making the nettle danger soft for us as silk.
We welcome back our bravest and our best;—
Ah me! not all! some come not with the rest,
Who went forth brave and bright as any here!
I strive to mix some gladness with my strain,
But the sad strings complain,
And will not please the ear:
I sweep them for a paeon, but they wane
Again and yet again
Into a dirge, and die away, in pain.
In these brave ranks I only see the gaps,
Thinking of dear ones whom the dumb turf wraps,
Dark to the triumph which they died to gain:
Fitlier may others greet the living,
For me the past is unforgiving;
I with uncovered head
Salute the sacred dead,
Who went, and who return not.—Say not so!
'Tis not the grapes of Canaan that repay,
But the high faith that failed not by the way;
Virtue treads paths that end not in the grave;
No bar of endless night exiles the brave;
And to the saner mind
We rather seem the dead that stayed behind.
Blow, trumpets, all your exultations blow!
For never shall their aureoled presence lack:
I see them muster in a gleaming row,

With ever-youthful brows that nobler show;
We find in our dull road their shining track;
In every nobler mood
We feel the orient of their spirit glow,
Part of our life's unalterable good,
Of all our saintlier aspiration;
They come transfigured back,
Secure from change in their high-hearted ways,
Beautiful evermore, and with the rays
Of morn on their White Shields of Expectation!

From the Ode Recited at the Harvard Commemoration.